Florida State University Journal of Land Use and Environmental
Law
Volume 33
Number 1 Fall 2017

Article 5

April 2018

Policy Mechanisms, Precedent, and Authority for State
Implementation of Climate Change Agendas
Michael Melli

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/jluel
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Melli, Michael (2018) "Policy Mechanisms, Precedent, and Authority for State Implementation of Climate
Change Agendas," Florida State University Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law: Vol. 33 : No. 1 ,
Article 5.
Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/jluel/vol33/iss1/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Florida State University Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

Policy Mechanisms, Precedent, and Authority for State Implementation of
Climate Change Agendas
Cover Page Footnote
An early draft of this Note was selected for presentation at the Florida State University College of Law's
Wnvironmental, Land Use, and Energy Law 2017 Colloquium. J.D. Candidate, The Florida State University
College of Law, 2018; B.A.,The University of Central Florida, 2014. The author wishes to thank Ms. Kirsten
Hilborn, as well as Mr. and Mrs. John and Margaret Melli, for the relentless support and encouragement.
In addition, the author thanks Professor and Associate Dean Shi-Ling Hsu, for the invaluable feedback,
comments, and insight this Note benefited from.

This note is available in Florida State University Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/
jluel/vol33/iss1/5

POLICY MECHANISMS, PRECEDENT, AND AUTHORITY
FOR STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE
AGENDAS
MICHAEL MELLI***

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................
THE AUTHORITY FOR STATE CLIMATE CHANGE
INITIATIVES .........................................................................
A. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ..............................................
B. STATE CONSTITUTIONS .................................................

1.
2.

146

148
148
150
Provisions Inspired by Federal Actions ................ 151
Recreation of Federal Authority ............................ 153

3. Allocation of Power and Responsibility Within
State Governments by Constitutional
Provisions ................................................................ 154
4. Self-Executing Environmental Provisions ............ 155
5. In Summation ......................................................... 156
III.

IV.

V.

VI.
VII.

THE GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2006 ..............
A. A POTENTIAL PRODUCT: THE GLOBAL WARMING
SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2008...............................................
B. PRECEDENT: GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER'S
ADMINISTRATION ..........................................................
MISCELLANEOUS LEGISLATIVE TOOLS ...............................
A. THEPOWEROFTHEPURSE ...........................................
B. CENSURE AND IMPEACHMENT ......................................
C. REDISTRICTING .............................................................
D. JOINT RESOLUTIONS .....................................................
THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE AND THE
MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION
ACCORD ...............................................................................
A. THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE ............
B. MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION
ACCORD .........................................................................
THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF ENTERPRISE
SUSTAINABILITY ..................................................................
WASHINGTON STATE'S CARBON TAX ..................................
A. INFLUENCES AND PRECEDENTS ....................................

157
160
161
163
163
164
164
165

166
166
168
168
1 70

171

An early draft of this Note was selected for presentation at the Florida State
University College of Law's Environmental, Land Use, and Energy Law 2017 Colloquium.
J.D. Candidate, The Florida State University College of Law, 2018; B.A., The
"
University of Central Florida, 2014. The author wishes to thank Ms. Kirsten Hilborn, as well
as Mr. and Mrs. John and Margaret Melli, for the relentless support and encouragement. In
addition, the author thanks Professor and Associate Dean Shi-Ling Hsu, for the invaluable
feedback, comments, and insight this Note benefited from.

145

146

VIII.

IX.

X.

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 33:1

1. British Columbia .................................................... 172
2. Oregon ..................................................................... 172
3. Vermont .................................................................. 173
INFORMATION-GENERATING ORGANIZATIONS .................... 173
A. LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES ........................................... 174
B. SUB-CABINETS, COMMISSIONS, AND ADVISORY
GROUPS ......................................................................... 176
RECENT ACTION .................................................................. 177
A. THE PARIS CLIMATE ACCORD ....................................... 178
B. THE CLEAN POWER PLAN.............................................. 179
CONCLUSION······································································· 180

In an era of heightened partisanship, animosity, and gridlock, the
chances of federal action to combat climate change seem increasingly
bleak at best. In response to the federal administrative machine
slowing and eight years of regulatory schemes being altered, in
regards to climate change, state governments have the ability, and
precedent, to methodically begin to step in and fill the gap left by the
administrative state. This note discusses the power and authority of
state action to address climate change and later moves to a thorough
examination of existing climate change initiatives at the state level.
In addition, this note gathers and explores potential abilities of state
governments to respond to climate change through their vested
powers and instruments. Finally, this note illustrates and examines
several examples of state actors already taking the helm. This note
more broadly contends that (1) states themselves have increasingly
significant capability to address climate change and (2) there exists
ample bipartisan, and modern, precedent from various state actors
in the environmental and climate change arena providing a
framework for modern state action.

I. INTRODUCTION
November 6th, 2012, 11:15AM, hours before Governor Romney's
defeat, President, then citizen, Donald J. Trump tweeted "The
concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in
order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive. 1 The President
has been unclear if he maintains this belief, 2 but the new EPA
Administrator has made it unequivocally obvious the Trump
1.
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWIITER (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:15AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en.
2.
See generally John Schwartz, Trump's Climate Views: Combative, Conflicting and
Confusing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/climate/donaldtrump-global-warming-views.html (examining statements made by President Trump
regarding climate change).
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Administration will not be spearheading climate change progress.
Indeed, it appears the federal arena is no longer the battlefield in
the fight against climate change.
So, what is to be done? The existence of climate change has near
4
universal consensus in the scientific community; but public policy
initiatives are no less needed now than they were previously. The
Note argues our Republic's system of cooperative federalism
provides the future for combating climate change. This Note works
to show that states are afforded a wealth of opportunity to take
action.
Common sense dictates that perhaps the last thing these
initiatives need are legal quarrels challenging authority. Discussion
and examination of various sources of authority for state action
bring clarity to the occasionally tangled legal framework of dual
sovereignty. Federal climate change and environmental action has
long been the subject of derision from opponents; 5 conservatives
have previously insisted state and local governments should have a
larger role in environmental regulation than the federal
government. 6 This Note illustrates that states, however, have
distinct and at times more steadfast sources of authorization to fight
climate change. How states are handed the power to make law
regarding the environment and how states codify that authority
within their var10us charters and constitutions warrant
examination.
There has been climate change action seen at the state level, but
what form does it take? State bodies have worked to implement,
occasionally in a bipartisan fashion, various steps to address climate
change. Further, it appears the state climate change initiatives
already seen were not solely to pander to various demographics or
electorates; state bodies empowered and implemented programs
that made change and avoided politics.
First, the Note examines, illustrates, and cements authority for
state action. After, this Note scrutinizes California's AB32, or the
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, and discuss legislative action
and precedent. Finally, the Note moves to examine tools the
3.
See generally Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, On Climate Change, Scott Pruitt
Causes an Uproar-and Contradicts the EPA's Own Website, WASH. POST Mar. 9, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/09/on-climatechange-scott-pruitt-contradicts-the-epas-own-website/?utm_term=.8f42634e2dda (discussing
EPA Administrator Pruitt's controversial comments on climate change).
4.
Clare Foran, Donald Trump and the Triumph of Climate-Change Denial, THE
ATLANTIC, Dec. 25, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/donald-trumpclimate-change-skeptic-denial/510359/.
5. Barton H. Thompson Jr., Conservative Environmental Thought: The Bush
Administration and Environmental Policy, 32 ECOLOGYL.Q. 307, 344-45 (2005).
6. Id.
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legislature has in tandem with the executive, and pertinent
parallels to Governor Rockefeller's work in State of New York. Next,
discussion of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and
the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord proves
illuminating. Then, this Note dissects and elaborates on the
Minnesota Office of Enterprise Sustainability, an inter-agency
watchdog organization similar to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs. This Note moves to then examine the
Washington State Carbon Tax initiative to illustrate another
excellent tool at the disposal of states. Finally, this Note explores
information-gathering commissions and committees.
Several sections and subsections are dedicated to potential tools
at the disposal of state governments. While much precedent has
been set, not every tool and resource has been exhausted. This Note
works to broadly discuss the tools reserved by state governments
between discussion of precedent and recent action.
The last subsection of this Note works to show the proposals
argued in action, already. Several examples of state actors bucking
the federal government's lead and taking action utilizing state
authority warrant examination. These recent actions could create
resounding precedent and work as a catalyst for further state action.
This Note serves not to provide politicized actors with a route to
circumvent the President in a deceptive fashion, but to illustrate the
very real and very legal authority and actions states have and can
take to combat climate change. There can be no doubt many of the
state actions witnessed are born of partisanship; nonetheless, these
actions rely on steadfast authority. This Note advocates for an
alternate path forward, the path of wanton legality, the path welltraveled, and the path that can serve to make a real difference in
climate change.

II. THE AUTHORITY FOR STATE CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES
A. The U.S. Constitution

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively, or to the people." 7
The promise of the Republic guarantees states a role as a
sovereign in their individual realms, and thus, the ability to protect
their lands and environment. 8 Chief Justice Taft famously opined,
7.
8.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1999).
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"We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the
same territory. Each may, without interference by the other, enact
laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation
can give validity to acts prohibited by the amendment." 9 This
section works to untangle the interwoven strings of authority
granted to the states and federal government to regulate climate
change and the environment.
Criticisms of climate change or environmental action, especially
criticisms of a political nature, range from a larger role for states,
overregulation, and even skepticism of the need for environmental
protection. IO Federal environmental regulations are still such a
source of ire to some that as recently as February of 2017 a
bill was drafted in the House of Representatives to
abolish the Environmental Protection Agency altogether. 11 Federal
environmental regulation has long been hobbled by the need for
state and local cooperation to implement initiatives-geography,
costs, and resources have required local governments to work with
the federal government. 12
The Supreme Court previously enumerated state interest and
sovereignty, in regards to environmental and land use regulation,
13
distinct from federal interests. What has come to be known as the
"quasi-sovereign" interest in protecting the land of the state or
commonwealth was perhaps most notably observed in Tennessee
Copper, 14 which served to solidify the state's role in environmental
15
protection.
"[The state] has the last word as to whether its
mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall
16
breathe pure air." States witnessed their right to control and
protect their land enumerated. 17
Much of the legal analysis regarding the interests and controls
vested in the states takes legal analysis and discussion from the
nation's foundation into consideration. Opinions addressing state
standing and sovereignty show justices considering what states
9.
10.
11.
12.

United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
Thompson, supra note 5, at 312-13.
To Terminate the Environmental Protection Agency, H.R. 861, 115th Cong. (2017).
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
13. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 327 (1907).
14. Id.
15. See Robert V. Percival, The Frictions of Federalism: The Rise and Fall of the Federal
Common Law of Interstate Nuisance (U. of Maryland, Pub-Law Research Paper No. 2003-02,
2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=452922 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.452922 (discussing
the quasi-sovereign interest doctrine and dogma).
16. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237.
17. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 439 F. Supp. 2d 486,
489 (W.D.N.C. 2006).
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forfeited individually when joining the union and what powers they
retained; Madison, The Federalist Papers or various framers of the
18
Constitution end up cited in quasi-sovereign legal analysis.
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak & Circle Village would later
discuss this in a 1991 Supreme Court ruling: "[t]he States entered
19
the federal system with their sovereignty intact." The principle
iterated through Federalist No. 39, "a residuary and inviolable
20
[state] sovereignty," recurs in state sovereignty discussion.
The following section discusses how state constitutions have
enshrined their own authority to regulate and take environmental
action given the Federal Constitution's grant of power. Which state
actors are granted which powers, and the manner in which states
created the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the power to
regulate is remarkably unique.

B. State Constitutions
"The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
union a republican form of government, and shall protect
each of them against invasion; and on application of the
legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot
.
domestic
. v10
. 1ence. ,,21
b e convene d) against
The Guarantee Clause promises each state an individualized
22
government and constitution.
Still, some scholars and
commentators raise questions on the validity of state constitutions
23
and their constitutionality to even come in to existence at all.
Nevertheless, the strong federal interest for maintaining state
24
charters and constitutions lies within the Guarantee Clause.
Below, this Note discusses various state constitution provisions
pertinent to climate change initiatives. Separate from uncertainty
of the validity of state constitutions, some skepticism has been
18. See e.g., Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934).
19. 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison). For discussion of the use of this principle
by the Supreme Court, see generally Michael J. Mano, Contemporary Visions of the Early

Federalist Ideology of James Madison: An Analysis of the United States Supreme Court's
Treatment of the Federalist No. 39, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 257, (2004).
21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
22. See Thomas A. Smith, Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation
of the Guarantee Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1984) (broadly examining the Guarantee
Clause).
23. Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PA
ST. L. REV. 837, 839 (2011).
24. Jacob M. Heller, Death by A Thousand Cuts: The Guarantee Clause Regulation of
State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1718 (2010) (analyzing the interplay between state
constitutional doctrine and the Guarantee Clause).
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sparked from the stark contrast in length, amendment
25
process, and revision procedure among the individual states. State
26
constitutional revision and amendment is widely varied. West
Virginia's Constitution has a provision discussing lotteries, raffles,
27
and bingo. Minnesota's Constitution grants citizens the right to
"peddle the products of a farm or garden" without a license. 28 This
codification of varied and unusual provisions serves as a precedent
working to the advantage of advocates for state action in climate
change as several states guarantee environmental dignity to their
citizens.
1. Provisions Inspired by Federal Actions

The initial passage of environmental legislation and the growth
of the environmental movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s
that began federal presence in preservation of the environment
29
had resounding effects on state constitutions. Public support for
environmental safeguards, at the time, was relatively widespread, 30
and in the early stages of regulatory presence in the environment, a
movement formed for environmental protection to be preserved in
state constitutions; fortunately, support for initial environmental
31
regulation was mildly more bipartisan.
Republican Governor
Francis Sargent signed environmental protection bills into law and
led Massachusetts when the provision was added to their
Constitution in 1972. 32 Below, a sample of various state
constitutional provisions is included, some of which are state bills of
rights, all are a product of the early environmental movement.

25. E.g., id.; Daniel B. Rodriguez, Change That Matters: An Essay on State
Constitutional Development, 115 PA ST. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2011).
26. Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions:
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473,
1477-78 (1987).
27. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 36. (subsection titled "Lotteries; Bingo; Raffles; County
Option").
28. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 7. (subsection titled "No License Required to Peddle").
29. See Bruce Ledewitz, The Challenge of, and Judicial Response to, Environmental
Provisions in State Constitutions, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 33, 33--34 (1991) (broadly
showing federal and state court confusion and reluctance in interpreting state constitutions).
30. See generally Chris Mooney, When Did Republicans Start Hating
the Environment?, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/
environment/2014/08/republicans-environment-hate-polarization (illustrating historical
context for political polarization in regards to environmental legislation, regulation, and law).
31. Jaime Fuller, Environmental Policy Is Partisan. It Wasn't Always, WASH. POST,
June 2, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/06/02/su pport-for-theclean-air-act· has-changed-a-lot-since-1970/?utm_term= .cc2f453b5527.
32. See Richard Evans, Conservation Conveyancing: When Your Client Is Posterity,
37 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 201, 203 (2015) (discussing environmental litigation and early
foundations).
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The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural
resources are the common property of all the people,
including generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people. 33
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all
the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to which
they have been heretofore entitled under the charter and
usages of this state, including but not limited to fishing from
the shore, the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to
swim in the sea and passage along the shore; and they shall
be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of the
natural resources of the state with due regard for the
preservation of their values; and it shall be the duty of the
general assembly to provide for the conservation of the air,
land, water, plant, animal, mineral and other natural
resources of the state, and to adopt all means necessary and
proper by law to protect the natural environment of the
people of the state by providing adequate resource planning
for the control and regulation of the use of the natural
resources of the state and for the preservation, regeneration
and restoration of the natural environment of the state. 34
The people shall have the right to clean air and water,
freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the
natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of their
environment; and the protection of the people in their right
to the conservation, development and utilization of the
agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natural
resources is hereby declared to be a public purpose.
The general court shall have the power to enact
legislation necessary or expedient to protect such rights.
In the furtherance of the foregoing powers, the general
court shall have the power to provide for the taking, upon
payment of just compensation therefor, or for the acquisition
by purchase or otherwise, of lands and easements or such
other interests therein as may be deemed necessary to
accomplish these purposes.

33. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
34. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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Lands and easements taken or acquired for such
purposes shall not be used for other purposes or otherwise
disposed of except by laws enacted by a two thirds vote, taken
35
by yeas and nays, of each branch of the general court.
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable
rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful
environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic
necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties,
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking
their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways. In
enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding
. 36
respons1"b"l"
1 1ties.
Fortuitously, for activists and enthusiasts, these prov1s10ns,
generally, have yet to be removed from state constitutions following
the national hyper-politicization of environmental regulation. It
should be noted, that when states begin to take the reigns and start
to have a serious role in addressing climate change, and source their
authority exclusively to these provisions, state actors of opposing
stances likely have paths to remove these provisions. 37
2. Recreation of Federal Authority
The Federal Constitution is remarkably concise when
held in comparison to state constitutions. 38 As previously, stated,
states share authority with the federal government to begin
environmental regimes. 39 As with the prior subsection and the
following subsections, excerpts from varied state constitutions
illustrating this point have been included.
"The Governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."40
"The supreme executive power of this state shall be vested in
a governor, who shall be responsible for the enforcement of
41
the laws of this state."

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

MASS. CONST. art. XCVII, §3.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See generally Rodriguez, supra note 25; Colantuono, supra note 26.
Landau, supra note 23, at 839.
See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5.
KAN. CONST. art. I, § 3.

154

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 33:1

"... and they shall have all other powers necessary for the
Legislature of a free and sovereign State; but they shall have
no power to add to, alter, abolish, or infringe any part of this
Constitution."42
"The General Assembly shall have the power to make all
laws not inconsistent with this Constitution, and not
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, which it
shall deem necessary and proper for the welfare of the
state."43
These provisions echo the Federal Constitution's Necessary and
Proper Clause for Congress and the Take Care Clause for
the President-the two have enabled a great deal of federal
44
45
environmental action, alongside the Commerce Clause. Thus, it
can be inferred that granting similar powers to state legislatures,
with minimal federalism principles binding states, enables climate
change and environmental legislation from the statehouses.

3. Allocation of Power and Responsibility Within State
Governments by Constitutional Provisions
This Note moves to now illustrate how state constitutions can
begin to provide directives or mandates for which state actors are to
draw instruction on how to act upon environmental issues. The
provided provisions detail natural resources broadly and are absent
climate change specific language. More generally, these provisions
can be seen to create stability and allocate power deliberately and
.
.
1n a precise manner.
The natural resources of the state, including air and
water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality
of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and
replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the
health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature
46
shall enact laws to implement this policy.

42. VT. CONST. Ch. II, § 6.
43. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
44. See Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1064
(2013) (discussing the foundation for federal action in regards to the environment).
45. James R. May, Healthcare, Environmental Law, and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis Under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Tax and Spending Clauses, 43
ENVTL. L. 233, 245 (2013).
46. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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For the benefit of present and future generations, the
State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect
Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including
land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall
promote the development and utilization of these resources
in a manner consistent with their conservation and in
furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State.
All public natural resources are held in trust by the State
for the benefit of the people. 47

"It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect
its natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision
shall be made by law for the abatement of air and water
pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise and for the
. an d protect10n
. of natura1 resources. " 48
conservat10n
Crucial to the notion of modern separation of powers doctrine
and jurisprudence is the preservation of powers within each
49
individual branch of governance. State constitution provisions
assigning specific duty and authority over environmental or natural
resource action are, essentially, a double-edged sword. Despite the
precedential benefits, these prevent any government actor, aside
from the constitutionally designated actor, from taking action when
acting solely on the subject matter enumerated by the state
constitution. Thus, these may benefit those actors who are
opponents of climate change initiatives.
4. Self-Executing Environmental Provisions
The aforementioned provisions expressly address paths and
concerns regarding law and rule making. However, this Note shifts
to show that state constitutions retain the capacity to go beyond
just preservation of power to regulate climate change or the
environment, and almost begin to govern by dictating state action.
The following examples are limited to pertinent constitutional
provis10ns regarding the environment, but action through
constitutional amendment and revision is by no means limited to
environmental matters.

47. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
48. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7.
49. See Josh Blackman, Donald Trump's Constitution of One, THE NAT'L REV.
(May 12, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/435296/donald-trumps-constitutionend-separation-powers.
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The fees, monies, or funds arising from the operation and
transactions of said Commission and from the application
and the administration of the laws and regulations
pertaining to the bird, fish, game and wildlife resources of
the State and from the sale of property used for said purposes
shall be expended and used by said Commission for the
control, management, restoration, conservation and
regulation of the bird, fish, game and wildlife resources of the
State, including the purchase or other acquisition of property
for said purposes, and for the administration of the laws
50
pertaining thereto and for no other purpose.
The people of the State of Colorado intend that the net
proceeds of every state-supervised lottery game operated
under the authority of Article XVIII, Section 2 shall be
guaranteed and permanently dedicated to the preservation,
protection, enhancement and management of the state's
wildlife, park, river, trail and open space heritage, except as
specifically provided in this article. Accordingly, there shall
be established the Great Outdoors Colorado Program to
preserve, protect, enhance and manage the state's wildlife,
51
.
.
park , river,
trai·1 an d open space h entage.
Common sense dictates provisions akin to the listed examples
are capable of being seen more frequently in states with
constitutional amendment and revision schemes that allow
for frequent plebiscite amendment and revision. 52 These provide an
advantageous path for a motivated electorate, if state actors are
53
unengaged in climate change or environmental issues.
5. In Summation
Over half the states have addressed natural resources or other
54
environmental concerns in their constitutions. As climate change
action begins to be taken on at the state level, a second
environmental movement may lie, waiting to catch fire. The beauty
of these provisions is that they wait in the shadows as a resource,

50. OKLA. CONST. art. XXVI, § 4.
51. COLO. CONST. art. XXVII, § 1.
52. See generally Robert F. Williams, Evolving State Constitutional Processes of
Adoption, Revision, and Amendment: The Path Ahead, 69 ARK. L. REV. 553, 554-62 (2016).
53. John C. Tucker, Constitutional Codification of an Environmental Ethic, 52 FLA. L.
REV. 299, 325 (2000).
54. Id. at 307.
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while the dangers and perils of climate change increase. Some
previously enumerated prov1s10ns listed in states' bill of
rights-Pennsylvania's, as an example, "[t]he people have a right to
clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic,
historic and esthetic values of the environment"-can be used
as a source of action. 56 If President Trump's environmental nonenforcement regime and rollback of Obama-era climate change
policies motivate state actors in Pennsylvania, they can claim the
mandate provided by the Pennsylvania State Constitution. This
provision calls for the state to preserve the people's right to natural
rights like clean air or pure water.
The excerpts and examples provided are not an exhaustive list
purporting to be absolute, rather an illustrative, substantive subset
showing the varied nature of state constitution and environmental
authority. Statehouses and capitols will likely emerge as the next
battlefield for climate change initiatives, and fortunately, there is
ample authority for them to act-both in the Federal Constitution
and state constitutions-and no shortage of need.
III. THE GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2006
Below, this Note begins to examine and delicately elucidate
California's AB32, or the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, and
its potential inspirations. Not intended to sequester the efficacy of
the legislature from the rest of this piece, later sections _will touch
on legislative power as well, but the following subsection focuses on
the substantive power of the legislature when operating in tandem
with the executive and the precedential ripples that can be created.
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed Assembly Bill 32
57
(AB32) into law in September of 2006. Among other reforms and
initiatives, in short, AB32 implemented a state program to
curb greenhouse gas emissions from statewide sources. 58 AB32 was
partially foreshadowed by executive order S-3-05, 59 from Governor
Schwarzenegger in 2005, that directed the California Air Resources
Board to begin substantial initiatives to curb greenhouse
55. See generally Alissa Scheller, 2 Degrees Will Change the World, MOTHER JONES
(Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2015/11/2-degrees-will-changeworld-paris-climate-change (broadly examining the future risks of climate change).
56. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (emphasis added).
57. Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Highlights California's
Global Warming Accomplishments On Eve Of AB 32 Anniversary, Sept. 25, 2008,
https://www.gov.ca.gov/news. php ?id= 10632.
58. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 38500 (2006).
59. See Mary D. Nichols, California's Climate Change Program: Lessons for the Nation,
27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 185, 198 (2009) (summarizing AB32 and discussing national
climate change needs).
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gases statewide and set substantial targets. 60 The California Air
Resources Board needed more authority to enact the Governor's
executive order from the state legislature. 61 AB32 creates longlasting compliance plans that are still being monitored by the
62
California Air Resources Board. The timeline for AB32 extends to
2020 and creates a deadline for greenhouse gas emissions caps; 63
one of the stated goals of AB32 is to return California's emission
64
levels to where they were in 1990.
AB32 created an annual mandatory reporting requirement
for emissions of greenhouse gases from private businesses. 65 AB32
authorized imposition of non-compliance penalties from AB32. 66 In
addition, AB32 has provisions centered on creating a database at
the governmental level of the largest producers and emitters of
greenhouse gases, for better response and management from the
state government. 67
Separate from reporting requirements, administrative reform,
or creation of large-scale plans for greenhouse gas emissions,
68
AB32 also ushered in new advisory and regulatory boards. The
Environmental Advisory Justice Committee was created to meet
with and advise the California Air Resources Board in
long-term implementation of AB32. 69 In addition, an Economic
and Technology Advancement Advisory Committee was
created to further advise the board; 70 the committee submitted its
investigatory findings to the Board on how best to implement
71
measures and developments from AB32 immediately.
Further, the California Air Resources Board pioneered a capand-trade scheme with the Provincial Government of Quebec. 72 On
January 1st, 2014, Quebec and California formally began
their program to trade greenhouse gas emission allowances. 73 The
60. Cal. Exec. Order S-3-05 (June 1, 2005), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=l86l.
61. See California Climate Change, California Climate Change Executive Orders
(Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/state/executive_orders.html.
62. Nichols, supra note 59, at 199--201.
63. Id. at 200-01.
64. See, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY-AIR RESOURCES
BOARD,
Assembly
Bill
32:
An
Overview,
(last visited
Oct.
20,
2017)
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (describing AB32 generally).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY§ 38580 (2006).
68. See generally Nichols, supra note 59, at 198--202.
69. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY§ 38591 (2006).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, California Cap and Trade, 13,
(2014) https://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/key-legislation/california-cap-trade#Revenue
(last visited Nov. 3, 2017).
73. Id.
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linkage program in 2015 saw a 2 percent decrease in emissions
covered from the year before-California remains on track to reach
74
1990 level emissions by 2020. The prominence and relative success
of the program drew Ontario, Canada's most populous province, to
75
join the cap-and-trade scheme with California and Quebec as well.
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Senate Bill 32 (SB32), passed in 2016, supplements AB32. 77
SB32 codifies a proVIs10n of Governor Brown's B-30-15
Executive Order. 78 With SB32 signed into law, by 2030 California's
greenhouse gas emission levels must be 40 percent below 1990 levels
and by 2050, 80 percent below. 79 SB32 also grants the California Air
Resources Board additional authority to promulgate more
80
regulations in order to meet the new standards.
In a testament to the majesty of well-functioning, traditional
law-making, Governors Schwarzenegger and Brown worked with
the California Legislature to implement the programs. State
74. Id. at 6. See also infra note 76 and accompanying chart.
75. See generally Allison Martell & Mike De Souza, Ontario Confirms it Will Join
Quebec, California in Carbon Market REUTERS, Apr. 13, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-climatechange-canada-idUSKBNON41X220150413 (examining recent decision by
Ontario to join cap-and-trade scheme).
76. CLEAN OIL AND GAS FOUND., California Extends Climate Change Bill, Seeks
40% Cut in GHGs Below 1990 Levels, http://cleanoilgasfoundation.org/california-clinatechange.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
77. S.B. 32, 2015-16 Reg. Sess. (Cali. 2016).
78. See Cal. Exec. Order No. B-30-15 (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.gov.
ca.gov/news.php?id=l8938; Richard Gonzalez, California Gov. Jerry Brown Signs New
Climate Change Laws, NAT'L. PuB. RADIO (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/08/493191842/california-gov-jerry-brown-signs-new-clima techange-laws.
79. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-30-15.
80. Id.
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agency, executive, and legislature thrived in tandem to apply one of
the nation's largest climate change initiatives seen to date. 81 Indeed,
as Professor Robert Stavins notes, "[t]his is a critical time for
82
California's climate change policies." These previous acts are
wide-ranging bills setting regulatory standards until the year 2050,
assuring the long-term stability of the plans enacted. It appears
AB32 has garnered substantive results in fighting climate change.
Perhaps there is merit to California Air and Resources Board
Chairwoman, Mary Nichols', quote ''What the nation needs now is a
federal Global Warming Solutions Act, modeled after California's
efforts, and building off of the time-tested 'cooperative federalism'
framework." 83
A. A Potential Product: The Global Warming

Solutions Act of 2008
As noted, Chairwoman Nichols implored the federal
government to recreate the California Global Warming Solutions
Act. 84 Massachusetts, however, took the helm and instituted similar
legislation. Democratic Governor Deval Patrick, and Republican
Governor Charlie Baker each have taken proactive AB32-esque
action. Without a doubt, the precedent shows bipartisanship works
best to prompt state governments to address climate change.
Governor Patrick signed Massachusetts' Global Warming
Solutions Act (GWSA) into law in 2008. 85 The GWSA requires that
by "2020 statewide greenhouse gas emissions ... be between 10 per
86
cent and 25 per cent below the 1990 emissions level." The GWSA
sets a long-term goal of an 80% reduction by 2050, as well. Common
sense dictates this gallant reform was, at least partially, inspired by
AB32, even if in name only. At the time of signing, fans praised the
GWSA for acting in the midst of uncertainty about the direction the
nation would head in, 87 as the country was in the throes of the 2008
81.

See David Siders, This Is What The Climate Bill Jerry Brown Signed Means, THE

Sept. 8, 2016, http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitolalert/articlel00734142.htm1.
82. Robert N. Stavins, California Steps Forward on Climate but Emphasizes a Poor
Policy Choice, 34 THE ENVTL. F. 2, 15 (2017).
83. Nichols, supra note 59, at 212 (citation omitted).
84. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
85. Michael P. Norton, Mass. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Down 21 Percent, THE LOWELL
SUN, Apr. 4, 2017, http://www.lowellsun.com/breakingnews/ci_30897 427/mass-greenhousegas-emissions-down-21-percent.
86. Global Warming Solutions Act, 2008 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 298 (S.B. 2540) (2008).
87. See generally Global Warming Solutions Act Passes Legislature, THE
MARBLEHEAD REP., Aug. 1, 2008 http://marblehead.wickedlocal.com/x1566624572/GlobalWarming-Solutions-Act-passes-Legislature (discussing recent environmental legislation from
the Massachusetts State Legislature).
SACRAMENTO BEE,
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Presidential Election when the bill was signed. 88 Advocates have
opined this bold reform has put Massachusetts "at the head of the
pack" in the fight against climate change. 89
Moving from legislative action mirroring California, Governor
Baker's executive order seems starkly similar to Governor Brown's
91
actions. 90 In 2016, Governor Baker signed Executive Order 569.
Executive Order 569 directed the Governor's executive agencies to
start taking substantial steps to individually address climate
change. 92 Executive Order 569 mandated the administration to
begin drafting adaptation plans across the Commonwealth. 93 It
should be noted, drawing staunch parallels to Governor Brown,
Baker doubled down support of the initial Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2008, signed into law by his predecessor-of
94
an opposite party.
Executive Order 569 mandates that the
administration make sure it is in compliance and on track to meet
the long term requirements of the GWSA. 95
The magnificence of AB32, it appears, is that it has created a
ripple effect. California and Massachusetts stand as glistening
examples of how climate change can be addressed across political
lines. These two examples serve, more broadly, however, to
illustrate the tools in the hands of statehouses to combat climate
change.

B. Precedent: Governor Rockefeller's Administration
Governors Schwarzenegger and Brown's actions in fighting
climate change in California were undoubtedly admirable and
unique; yet, this is not to imply the two were the first governors to
artfully implement environmental initiatives with the legislature's
cooperation. Governor Nelson Rockefeller excelled, particularly, as

88. Id.
89. David Danielson, Finally, a Good Energy Policy, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 7, 2008),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/410570/finally-a-good-energy-policy/.
90. See supra note 78--80 and accompanying text.
91. Mass. Exec. Order. No. 569 (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/
executive-order-climate-change-strategy.pd£.
92. Id.
93. See Brook J. Detterman, Massachusetts Governor Baker Signs Executive Order 569
On Climate Change, THE NAT'L L. REV., Oct. 24, 2016, http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/massachusetts-governor-baker-signs-executive-order-569-climate-change (examining
Governor Baker's Executive Order 569's climate change efforts and affects).
94. See generally Michael P. Norton & Andy Metzger, Baker Order Requires Climate
Change Plan, THE TELEGRAM, Sept. 16, 2016, http://www.telegram.com/news/20160916/
baker-order-requires-climate-change-plan (broadly examining Executive Order 569 and
climate change in Massachusetts).
95. Detterman, supra note 93.
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a statesman and environmentalist, through implementation of his
initiatives and creation of long term precedent.
Adirondack Park is a substantive part of the New York Forest
Preserve, 96 Governor Rockefeller's legislative efforts worked to set
up a commission to find a way to properly administer conservation
and environmental management efforts. 97 Rockefeller spearheaded
the creation of, and utilized his bully pulpit to lobby for, a bill he
eventually signed it into law, the Adirondack Park Agency Act,
which created a state agency to regulate the park properly
with state resources. 98 Rockefeller also worked to create, with the
legislature, a unified state environmental agency, 99 the New York
Department of Environmental Conservation, one of the first of such
100
measure and scope, in 1970.
Perhaps Rockefeller's greatest environmental legacy was
creating what some call the inspiration for the Clean Water Act
101
by introducing the Pure Waters Bond Act in 1965.
Rockefeller
lobbied hard for it's passage, and exhausted himself working
towards passing the Act. 102 The Pure Waters Bond Act touted it's
goals as making waters "swimmable and fishable" and, in addition,
worked to increase the efficacy and quantity of wastewater
103
management systems across the state. The Pure Waters Bond Act
still maintains a legacy of achieving environmental reform and
cleaning up New York's waters. 104 Rockefeller has been heralded as
an environmental trailblazer and noted for his precedent-setting

96. See generally Peter Bauer, Governor Andrew Cuomo and the Boreas Ponds,
ADIRONDACK ALMANACK (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.adirondackalmanack.com/2017/
03/governor-andrew-cuomo-and-the-boreas-ponds-part-1.html (discussing New York's
environmental state history).
97. Charles Gottlieb, Regional Land Use Planning: A Collaborative Solution for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 35, 58--59 (2014).
98. Stacey Lauren Stump, "Forever Wild" A Legislative Update on New York's
Adirondack Park, 4 ALBANY Gov'T L. REV. 682, 698 (2011).
99. Jeffrey Frank, Big Spender: Nelson Rockefeller's Grand Ambition, THE NEW
YORKER, Oct. 13, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/big-spender-2.
100. See Patricia E. Salkin, The Executive and the Environment: A Look at the Last Five
Governors in New York, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 706, 708 (2014).
101. James Tierney, Celebrating 50th of the Pure Waters Act, CLEAR WATERS,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/105432.html.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Willie Janeway, Editorial, Gov. Cuomo's Proposed Budget Fails to Invest Enough
in Clean Water, THE POST-STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2015, http://www.syracuse.com/opinion
/index.ssf/2015/01/gov_cuomos_proposed_budget_fails_to_invest_in_clean_water_commentar
y.html.
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action. 105 A governor set the path for federal action in the absence of
proper legislation, and undoubtedly, a governor, or governors could
do it again.

IV. MISCELLANEOUS LEGISLATIVE TOOLS
The examples above are sterling efforts by state governments to
address environmental issues facing states. Yet, state legislatures
possess several more tools to pursue or advocate for an agenda of
their choosing. Next, is a brief illustration of several well-known
tools state legislatures have that could apply to climate change
initiatives and give a few modern examples illustrating how
legislatures use these powers. These serve to prove that while
traditional lawmaking, cooperation between branches, has its
merits, many tools remain in the hands of the legislatures.
A. The Power of the Purse
Previously, this Note enumerated a subset of state constitution
prov1s10ns that mirror the Federal Constitution's dispersal
of power amongst the branches. 106 Statehouses themselves are
typically anointed with the "power of the purse." 107 Governor Tom
Wolf refused to sign the funding package the Pennsylvania General
Assembly sent to him in 2015, leading to a budget impasse and the
state operating without a budget for 266 days. 108 As illustrated,
governors without line-item vetoes, face the choice of complying
with oft seen omnibus appropriations bills or opposing them
entirely. Riders, or small provisions packaged within larger
legislation, are sent along in these bills that give legislatures power
over the governor. 109 The executive is more politically accountable
and thus faces greater risks if it vetoes appropriations and a
105. See Jeffrey Frank, Big Spender: Nelson Rockefeller's Grand Ambitions, THE NEW
YORKER, Oct. 13, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/big-spender-2;
Michael O'Donnell, Fortune's Son, THE NATION, Feb. 4, 2015,
https://www.thenation.com/article/fortunes-son/.
106. See supra Part II.B.
107. Ronald Snell, The Power of the Purse: Legislatures That Write State Budgets
Independently of the Governor, NAT'L. COUNCIL OF ST. LEGISLATURES, Mar. 2008,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/the-power-of-the-purse-legislatures-that-writest.aspx.
108. See Maria Panaritis & Kathy Boccella, Ending Budget Impasse, Wolf Says: 'We Need
to Move on', THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 24, 2016, http://www.philly.com/philly/
news/20160324_Wolf_relents_on_budget_ends_historic_impasse.html (explanation of the
2015 Pennsylvania Budget discord and resolution).
109. See Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of
Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (1997);
Brandon F. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for A Truth-in-Legislation
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 959---64 (1999).
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government shutdown results. Omnibus riders are an invaluable
tool in the hands of the state legislatures and could be used to
implement conservation or environmental plans.

B. Censure and Impeachment
The impeachment and censure tools are one of the few methods
the legislature has to grab headlines and attention statewide for a
cause important to them at a level comparable to the state
11
executive.
Further, impeachment and censure require little
cooperation from other branches of government. 111 Wallace Hall was
a member of the Texas Board of Regents, the governing body for the
State University System of Texas. 112 In 2013, the Texas Legislature
censured Regent Hall for "misconduct, incompetency in the
performance of official duties, or behavior unbefitting [of a
regent].',1 13 Impeachment and censure are often relegated to the
annals of history and not frequently used at the federal level, 114 the
previous example served to illustrate state legislatures are still very
capable of censure and impeachment. A state legislature, if held by
ardent environmental activists, could censure or impeach a head of
the state environmental agency, if the head refused to address
climate change or environmental issues to the legislatures liking.

°

C. Redistricting
Common sense dictates that the political fruit of redistricting or
gerrymandering are long-term investments. The demand for
immediate climate change action is strong, so does redistricting
deserve a place in the pantheon of tools state legislatures have?
State legislatures still retain the ability to draw maps more
115
sympathetic to their causes.
Some, not all, state legislatures hold
the sole power to redistrict and apportion state and federal district
110. See generally John Nichols, Censure and Impeachment, THE NATION, July 23, 2007,
https://www.thenation.com/article/censure-and-impeachment/
(general
analysis
of
impeachment power).
lll. Id.
ll2. See Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Panel Censures UT Regent Wallace L. Hall Jr., THE
AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN (Aug. ll, 2014), http://www.statesman.com/news/state-regional-govt--po1itics/panel-censures-regent-wallace-hall/dTKKhqoALaXjN90qb60nBM/
(discussion of Regent Hall impeachment scandal).
ll3. Id.
ll4. See generally Bill Schnieder, A Historical Tutorial on Impeachment, CNN
(Mar. ll, 1998), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/03/ll/impeachment.censure/
(broad examination of history of impeachment power in America).
ll5. See Christopher Ingraham, This is the Best Explanation of Gerrymandering You
Will Ever See, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2015/03/01/this-is-the-best-explanation-of-gerrymandering-you-will-ever-see/
(explaining redistricting and Gerrymandering).
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boundaries. 116 If these legislatures partake in gerrymandering
practices, they have the.capability to ensure districts are shaped to
117
their liking, and to their potential political or policy inclinations.
I

D. Joint Resolutions
Legislatures can also make broad statements, announce
resolutions, and initiate symbolic gesturing-akin to the executive's
use of press releases or utilization of state and national media
118
outlets--often utilized by Joint Resolutions. Utah State Senator
Jim Dabakis introduced Senate Joint Resolution 9 (S.J.R.9), or the
119
Joint Resolution on Climate Change in February of 2017. S.J.R.9
is a statement of the legislature's intent to address climate change
and its interest in better understanding the causes of climate
120
change.
Whereas, if left unaddressed, the consequences of a changing
climate have the potential to:
• [A]dversely impact all Americans;
• [A]ffect vulnerable populations the hardest;
• [H]arm productivity in key economic sectors such as
construction, agriculture, and tourism;
• [S]addle future generations with costly economic and
environmental burdens; and
• [l]mpose additional costs on state and federal budgets
that will further add to the long-term fiscal challenges
121
that we face as a state and nation.
The introduction of S.J.R.9 is a marked reversal from the
previously passed House Joint Resolution 12 (H.J.R.12), adopted in
2010, which implored the EPA to reverse its current course of
regulations on carbon dioxide reduction. 122 The utilization of a joint
resolution to call attention to issues the legislature determines at
116. See Christopher Ingraham, This is Actually What America Would Look Like Without
Gerrymandering, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/01/13/this-is-actually-what-america-would-look-like-withoutgerrymandering/ (illustrating non-Gerrymander-ed districts).
117. Redistricting, THE NAT'L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/redistricting.aspx.
118. The Legislative Process, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process/.
119. S.J. Res. 9 Joint Resolution on Climate Change, Utah State. Legis. Reg. Sess.
(2017).
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. H.R.J. Res. 12, Climate Change Joint Resolution, Utah State Legis. Reg. Sess.
(2010).

166

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 33:1

their discretion is a perceptive and resourceful tool the state
legislatures have at their disposal.

V. THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE AND THE
MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION ACCORD

Below, this Note emphasizes two notable pacts between states
led by governors. The listed examples are glistening demonstrations
of the power a governor has. However, the Interstate Compact
123
Clause limits the executive's agreement power.
The Supreme
Court iterated in Virginia v. Tennessee, that not all agreements from
states are subject by the bar established by the Interstate Compact
Clause. 124 Later in the case, the Supreme Court noted that states
may not enter into agreements that run afoul of the powers
125
of the federal government. As environmental and climate change
regulation is soundly within the realm of dual sovereignty, which
was examined earlier, interstate climate change agreements should
be protected from vulnerability in regards to this clause, especially
with the following two examples as precedent. However, this ought
to implore governors to proceed warily and try not to tread on any
authority or power so outside the realm of environmental and
climate change precedent it encroaches on the Virginia limits and
begins to lead to the "increase of political power in the states[;]"
thus, encroaching "upon or interfere[ing] with the just supremacy of
126
the United States."
A. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

In 2003, a bipartisan group of northeastern governors began
joint talks and information sessions that culminated with the
creation and individual approval of the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGl). 127 In 2005, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware,
New York, Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Maryland, and Massachusetts began the program to implement a
cap-and-trade scheme, and to focus on carbon dioxide emissions,
128
among power plants within their states.
The RGGI was created
largely in conformity with existing cap-and-trade frameworks;
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 3.
124. 148 U.S. 503, at 518-521 (1893).
125. Id. at 519.
126. Id.
127. Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1958, 1959-60 (2007).
128. Lauren E. Schmidt & Geoffrey M. Williamson, Recent Developments in Climate
Change Law, 37 COLO. LAW. 63, 70 (2008).
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however, the program does not span the entire economies of each
individual state, but focuses specifically on the energy sector. 129
This particular climate change program was born from the capacity
the state executive has to barter, negotiate, and exercise political
capital and function as a dignitary for the state to implement and
enter agreements above the state level. 130
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The RGGI is still functioning today and has produced positive
results in reducing carbon dioxide emissions while also saving
consumers millions. 132 New Jersey left the agreement in 2012, but
a movement at the state level has developed advocating rejoining
133
after several companies reported economic losses. A 40% decrease
in power sector carbon dioxide emissions has been reported since
the RGGI's implementation in 2005. 134

129. Robert Zeinemann, Emerging Practice Area: The Regulation of Greenhouse Gases,
82 WIS. LAW, 6, 8 (2009).
130. See generally Commentary, supra note 127, at 1958.
131. Silvio Marcacci, RGGI Carbon Market Invests $1 Billion in Clean Energy, CLEAN
TECHNICA, Apr. 22, 2015, https://cleantechnica.com/2015/04/22/rggi-carbon-market-invests-1billion-clean-energy/.
132. Committee Report, Report of the Climate Change & Emissions Committee, 31
ENERGY L.J. 571, 594--95 (2010).
133. FACT SHEET, ACADIA CENTER, ENTER, NEW JERSEY AND RGGI: POTENTIAL BENEFITS
OF RENEWED PARTICIPATION, http://acadiacenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Acadia
Center_RGGI_NJ_FactSheet_032415.pclf.
134. Report, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, INC., RGGI REPORT: INVESTMENTS PROVIDE
$2.9 BILLION IN ENERGY BILL SAVINGS; 3.7 MILLION PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS BENEFIT,
(Apr. 21,2015), http://www.rggi.org/docs/ProceedsReport/2013Proceeds%20Report_PR_Final.pdf.
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B. Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord
The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord was created
as an agreement between six midwestern governors and the
Premier of Manitoba. 135 Each of the individual states have large
agri-business sectors and are susceptible to climate change-induced
136
disaster. The Accord set up a blueprint for a multi-sector cap-and137
trade system in the region, and various other mitigation efforts.
The Accord produced the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction
138
Program, the formal write-up of the cap-and-trade program. The
Program included goals for curbing greenhouse gas emissions, and
discussed a potential cap-and-trade program, the management and
tracking of emissions, and regional incentives for implementing the
programs. 139
The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord remains a
high-profile verification of what can be done to combat climate
change with willing state executives. While no sweeping action has
been taken in the various statehouses of Accord members, and the
current executives are not pursuing it, 140 the Accord put together an
extensive study of how to implement regionally specialized
climate change mitigation programs. 141 Should executives of any
participating member-state seek to immediately take steps on
climate change, expensive studies and delays to develop plans are
not necessary, the Accord provides an on-demand blueprint.

VI. THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF ENTERPRISE SUSTAINABILITY
Administrative officers at the state level are employed at the
pleasure of the Governor and the Governor, vested with executive
authority, exercises mass influence over the organization of
agencies and the substantive manner the agencies operate. This has
proven true at the federal level and can function at the state level.
135. Erin Benoy, Note, Wanted: Farmer-Friendly Climate Change Legislation, 16 DRAKE
J. AGRIC. L. 147, 150 (2011).
136. Id. at 154.
137. Id.
138. See Press Release, Cal. Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Applauds
Nine Midwest States For Creating Regional Climate Partnership (Nov. 15, 2007),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=8109.
139. Id.
140. Maria Gallucci, Cap and Trade Resurrected? Some States Awaken to Its Economic
Benefits, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 12, 2012) https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/20120708/cap-and-trade-rgg-states-california-economic-benefits-energy-efficiency-jobscarbon-auctions-proceeds-deficits.
141. See Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY
SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regiona1-climate-initiatives/mggra. (last visited
Oct. 20, 2017).
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For example, President Clinton's Executive Order 12898 set up
·
1 J ustice.
· " 142
an "I n t eragency Wor k.1ng Group on E nvironmenta
Essentially, this group served as a watchdog organization spanning
the majority of the executive branch and working with each agency
to advance the goals of environmental justice pursuant to
the governor's policy preferences and agenda. 143 Below a hefty
illustration takes place of the steps the Governor of Minnesota has
already begun to take, utilizing similar methodology to the one that
President Clinton employed.
In 2016, Minnesota Governor Mark Dayton created the Office
144
of Enterprise Sustainability (OES).
The OES is a watchdog
accountability organization that monitors and works with the
existing executive agencies in Minnesota. 145 Lieutenant Governor
Tina Smith proclaimed, regarding Minnesota's climate change
actions, "State government has many opportunities to fight climate
change-by ensuring buildings are energy efficient, increasing our
reliance on renewable energies, choosing more fuel-efficient fleet
·_J!
d pureh as1ng
.
d ec1s10ns.
. .
" 146
. 1es, an d ma ki ng more 111.iorme
ve h 1c
Dayton's creation of OES was an effort to take immediate mitigation
steps within his own administration.
OES will provide agencies with the assistance needed to:
• Reduce greenhouse gas emissions and water usage,
• Increase energy efficiency and recycling, and
• Support better coordination of sustainability efforts across
state government.
• Develop sustainability plans to reduce costs associated with
147
operations while improving Minnesota's environment.
148

OES celebrated its first anniversary in August of 2017.
Before
the creation of OES, the Dayton Administration released a
substantive report, titled "Climate Solutions and Economic
149
Opportunities."
The report includes a brief manifesto of stated
goals and explanations of what can be done to tackle climate
142. Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
143. See generally id.
144. Press Release, Minn. Office of the Governor, Minnesota Establishes New Office
of Enterprise Sustainability to Fight Climate Change (July 20, 2016), http://mn.gov/
governor/newsroom/?id= 1055-249987.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, Office of Enterprise Sustainability,
http://mn.gov/admin/government/sustainability/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
148. Id.
149. MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY BOARD, Climate Solutions and Economic
Strategies: A Foundation for Minnesota's State Climate Action Planning (2016).
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150

change.
Direction and exercising of executive authority over state
agencies to implement climate change is one of the easiest steps to
151
be taken by the state executive to enact reform.

VII. WASHINGTON STATE'S CARBON TAX
As touched on earlier, statehouses hold many of the same
abilities as the federal government to make law regarding their
152
province.
Laying and collecting taxes is one of the federal
government's most obvious and infamous roles. 153 This ability is, of
course, extended to the states as well. 154 Washington State's failed
2016 carbon-tax initiative, also known as 1-732, serves as a staid
example of carbon taxes as a method for states to combat climate
change.
British Columbia's successful implementation of a carbon tax
program served as the inspiration for the Washington carbon tax
initiative. 155 If the measure had been successful starting on July 1,
2017, a tax rate, increasingly yearly, would have been placed
156
on metric tons of carbon used.
CarbonWA, a Washington activist
organization, sparked interest by garnering over 360,000 signatures
on a petition, 157 without Democratic Governor, and noted climate
change activist, 158 Jay lnslee's support, the initiative was sent to the
ballots during the 2016 election cycle. 159
The initiative suffered setbacks early on, with criticisms coming
from varied sides of the political aisles. 160 Some environmentalists
argued it did too little and harmed minority or impoverished
161
communities,
while other opponents derided it's very nature,
being an increased revenue collection method, anointed with "the
150. Id. at 3.
151. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, supra note 147.
152. See supra Part II, B, 2.
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
154. See Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?,
23 J. LEGIS. 171 (1997).
155. Cassandra Profita, A Carbon Tax In Oregon?, OR. PUB. BROAD., Jan. 8, 2013,
http://www.opb.org/news/blog/ecotrope/a-carbon-tax-in-oregon/.
156. Ferdinand Hogroian, 2016 Election Roundup, 26-FEB. J. MULTISTATE TAX'N 27,
2017 WL 117867.
157. Shi-Ling Hsu, Environmentalists' Disdain for Washington's Carbon Tax,
SLATE (Oct. 16, 2016) http://www.slate.corn/articles/health_and_science/science/2016/10/
environmentalists_are_against_i_7 32_washington_s_carbon_tax.html.
158. Marianne LaVelle, Washington State Voters Reject Nation's First Carbon
Tax, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS, (Nov. 9, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
09112016/washington-state-carbon-tax-i-732-ballot-measure.
159. Id.
160. See generally Hsu, supra note 157.
161. William Yardley, How A Tax On Carbon Has Divided Northwest Climate
Activists, THE L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-sej-carbon-taxwashington-20161011-sna p-story .html.
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dreaded word 'tax."' 162 The Sierra Club, markedly, declined to
endorse the initiative, alongside several other noteworthy activist
organizations. 163 Truly, the infighting between environmentalists
became well-known, and led to a Seattle Times Columnist calling it
"a liberal pig pile." 164
The election eventually came and I-732 failed by a 59%-41%
165
margin.
The valiant effort remains the highest profile carbon tax
166
initiative our nation has seen. Through this example, lessons can
be learned for other states; perhaps calling the potential programs
a "price adjustment" or "fee implementation" to avoid labeling
167
the carbon tax initiative with, the "t-word."
In addition,
environmentalists ought to stress that cannibalizing the efforts
from within will only serve to hinder the cause, long-run. Yet,
despite all its problems, I- 732 is a strong example of how states hold
the quasi-dormant ability to take the mantle in the fight against
climate change. Carbon taxes can originate from statehouses and be
signed into law without a plebiscite in some states, while others may
opt to place it on a ballot for a referendum. Regardless, states have
significant power and precedent in carbon tax initiatives.

A. Influences and Precedents
While I-732 serves as the most recent and perhaps most wellknown carbon tax initiative, it would be a disservice to not include
several trailblazers. While British Columbia's carbon tax is the most
notable, successfully passed initiative, it is necessary to include
Vermont's and Oregon's attempts for implementation of carbon
taxes. Not only did these three initiatives form precedent for states
wishing to implement carbon taxes, they serve to prove that the
issue of carbon taxation can leave the borders of Washington State.
Hefty and intricate analysis of these plans may not be necessary,
but some examination and explanation of their role, moving
forward, as precedent, warrant examination.

162. Hsu, supra note 157.
163. LaYelle, supra note 158.
164. Danny Westneat, Audubon Backs I-732 To Fight Climate Change-It's Better Than
Nothing, THE SEATILE TIMES, July, 13, 2016, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/audubon-backs-i-732-its-better-than-nothing/.
165. Matthew C. Boch, A Green Headache? Thinking About The Practical Implications
Of A State Carbon Tax, 26-FEB J. MULTISTATE TAX'N 35, 2017 WL 117870, 1.
166. Id.
167. Hsu, supra note 157.
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1. British Columbia

In February of 2008, British Columbia announced it would
168
introduce and implement a carbon tax initiative.
The initiative
drew fire and praise from the usual parties, some environmental
activists showing support and some opposing industrialists
levying criticisms. 169 While British Columbia's carbon tax met some
hiccups, generally the program is viewed as a success, "[o]verall,
[British Columbia]'s carbon tax has still returned more in reduced
taxes to B.C. households and businesses than it has taken in-and
170
will do so in the future." The carbon tax proved so inspirational,
the very columnist who described the 1-732 as a "liberal pig pile,"
171
also credited British Columbia's carbon tax as a model for 1-732.
Internationally, the United Nations and the World Bank have each
praised the British carbon tax plan. 172 While some domestic dissent
remains, and debate about the figures and results remain lively, the
program is a steadfast example of a successful climate change
initiative, and a carbon tax plan, taken at the state, or in this case,
provincial, level.
2. Oregon
Rumblings of an Oregonian statewide climate change initiative
began in 2009, but the pressures of the economic recession
173
and varying intimating political waves sank the movement.
Later on, in 2014, the Legislature proposed a significantly
174
more comprehensive and thorough carbon plan.
The Oregon
Legislature's carbon tax plan was thorough to say the least,
exemptions for certain classes of taxpayers were carved out, a
175
study was commissioned, and hefty debate was held. The study
reported that the program, if implemented, would have
168. David G. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 101
(2008).
169. Id.
170. Mark Cameron, The Real Lesson Ontario Can Take Away from B. C. 'S Carbon Tax,
MACLEAN'S. (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.macleans.ca/economy/economicanalysis/the-reallesson-ontario-can-take-away-from-b-c-s-carbon-tax/.
171. Westneat, supra note 164.
172. Mark Hume, B.C. Carbon Tax: An Effective Model For National Climate
Change Approach, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 10, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/british-columbia/bcs-carbon-tax-effective-in-reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissionsreport/article22017313/.
173. Scott Learn, Can Oregon's Climate Change Plan Survive A Down Economy?,
THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 17, 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/environmenUindex.ssf/2009/
01/can_oregons_climate_change_pla.html.
174. Nancy Shurtz, Carbon Pricing Initiatives in Western North America: Blueprint for
Global Climate Change Policy, 7 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 61, 123 (2016).
175. Id.
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dramatically reduced greenhouse gas emissions, while avoiding
· t h e economy. 176 Regretta bly, the plan never passed. 177 Yet,
h armmg
it can be inferred, that Oregon's neighbor to the North was not
oblivious to the movement and likely looked to the precedent Oregon
set. Oregon played a vital role in garnering momentum, one-by-one
carbon tax plans seem to be popping up at the state level, these
rumblings are significant and may eventually lead to a substantive
carbon tax; however, one thing is certain, they have ample authority
and precedent to back them up.
3. Vermont
Vermont also took the carbon tax battle by the horns through
178
House Bill 412 (HB412).
The 2015 bill ultimately met its demise
179
· committee,
·
1n
yet, muc h 1·k
1 e Oregon, V ermont' s e f£ort prov1"des a
blueprint and political momentum for further state initiatives. The
bill brought discussion to carbon taxation and climate
180
change initiatives to Vermont.
Vermont's climate change
measure, developed as 2015 was waning, undoubtedly influenced or,
at the least, was discussed by Washington's carbon tax activists
during the public debate ofl-732.

VIII. INFORMATION-GENERATING ORGANIZATIONS
States possess the ability to gather more concise, more relevant
to local issues, assemblies to address pertinent issues in climate
change or environmental policy. Climate change and even some
environmental policy still carries a stigma amongst some political
181
actors. The information-finders listed below, present and gather
information usually unique to their individual state to present to
the executive or legislature. These groups usually present
information in a vacuum off of the national stage. These assemblies,
consisting either of private citizens or public state actors,
can exercise significant clout by advising the governor

176. Wendy Culverwell, The Cost Of Carbon: Tax Would Be '.A Small Drag' On
Oregon Economy, THE PORTLAND Bus. J., Dec. 8, 2014, http://www.bizjournals.com/
portland/blog/sbo/2014/12/the-cost-of-carbon-tax-would-be-a-small-drag-on.html.
177. Shurtz, supra note 17 4, at 123.
178. H. 412, 2015-16 Gen. Assemb., Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2015).
179. Id.
180. Peter Hirschfeld, Vermont GOP Targets Democrats in New 'Stop The Carbon Tax'
Attack Ad, VERMONT PUB. RADIO, (Aug. 17, 2016), http://digital.vpr.net/post/vermont-goptargets-democrats-new-stop-carbon-tax-attack-ad#stream/0.
181. Fuller, supra note 31.
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and recommending changes. 182 Yet, the common thread running
between them is their substantive ability to gather information and
produce research on and study the varied needs facing states.

A. Legislative Committees
Federal congressional committees usually control the fate of any
given bill within their jurisdiction; they can issue subpoenas, hold
hearings, compel witnesses to produce data, and hold parties in
contempt. 183 Yet what can be done on the state level through these
committees? The following section works to elucidate the capacities
and abilities of these committees. Several state legislatures have
taken action to create legislative committees or commissions solely
addressed to climate change causes.
Alaska State Representative Andy Josephson introduced House
Bill 173 (HBl 73), an attempt to codify the progress made through
the Alaskan Climate Change Sub-Cabinet that Governor Palin had
organized, in the form of a seriarately molded committee to monitor
84
and address climate change.
The sub-cabinet, as common sense
dictates, can be called or dismissed at the pleasure of
the Governor. 185 HBl 73 attempts to distinctly codify and fund a
commission addressed to climate change is a utilization of the
186
legislatures tools to address climate change.
The North Carolina Legislature organized a Legislative
187
Commission on Global Climate Change in 2005. The Commission
was to conduct an in-depth examination and study of the nature of
climate change, the danger it presents to North Carolina,
and will make recommendations and publish its findings. 188 The
Commission was not meant to be a standing committee, but to
publish research and adopt findings; thus, after several extensions,
189
the Commission dissolved. The Bill creating the Commission was
signed into law by Governor Easley; should an opposing party have
taken power, the Commission would still have remained in
190
existence.
182. Governors' Use of Cabinets, NATIONAL GoVERNORS AsSOCIATION 1, 11-13
(Oct. 26, 2006), https://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/06GOVCABINT.PDF.
183. See generally The Role of Committees in the Legislative Process, THE UNITED STATES
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/general/Features/Committees.htm.
184. See Alaska Legislative Assembly, An Act establishing the Alaska Climate Change
Response Commission, H.R. 173 Alaska Legis. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Mar. 10, 2017).
185. See Governors' Use of Cabinets, supra note 182, at 11-13.
186. Id.
187. 2005 N.C. Session L. 442 ("An Act to Establish the Legislative Commission on
Global Climate Change").
188. See id.
189. Id. §11.
190. Id.
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California and Massachusetts each organized within their state
legislatures committees dedicated to addressing climate change.
These committees, an exercise in legislative power and autonomy,
hold massive power within their own states. The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts organized a House and Senate Committee on Global
Warming and Climate Change.

It shall be the duty of the House Committee on Global
Warming and Climate Change to consider all matters related
to the Commonwealth's climate policy, including but not
limited to greenhouse gas emissions, the climate impacts of
renewable energy development and climate change
adaptation and mitigation. The committee shall also serve in
an advisory capacity to other joint committees that consider
legislation with significant climate impacts, including but
not limited to environment, natural resources and ,
agriculture, transportation, energy, housing and economic
development and emerging technologies. The committee may
participate with other committees in joint hearings at the
request of the Speaker or by agreement of the committee
191
chairs.
Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker recently signed an
executive order attempting to begin curbing greenhouse gas
192
emissions within th~ commonwealth. Baker had the findings or
resources of the committees at the state government's disposal as
well to aid his drafting of the executive order. The committees
provide more research and resources than would be normally
available otherwise.
The California State Assembly created a standing Joint
Legislative Committee on Climate Change Policies that has been
relatively active in state climate change action. 193 While legislative
commissions wield substantial authority and power, they also hold
194
a great deal of discretion to exercise that authority and power.
California's Climate Change Committee stated from its inception it
seeks to take an active role in making findings and ascertaining
195
facts related to climate change.
191. HOUSE COMMI'ITEE ON GLOBAL WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://malegislature.gov/Committees/Detail/H51/About (last accessed Mar. 13, 2017).
192. Mass. Exec. Order No. 569 (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.mass.gov/governor/
legislationexecorder/execorders/executive-order-no-569.html.
193. See CALIFORNIA STATE AsSEMBLY, JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMI'ITEE ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, POLICIES, http://assembly.ca.gov/climatechangepolicies (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
194. See generally, United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (discussing
prosecutorial discretion).
195. Cal. Gov't. Code §9147.10 (2016).
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The Joint Legislative Committee on Climate Change
Policies is hereby created. The committee shall ascertain
facts and make recommendations to the Legislature
concerning the state's programs, policies, and investments
related to climate change. Those recommendations shall be
shared with other appropriate legislative standing
committees, including the Assembly Committee on Budget
and the Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review. 196
I assert these specialized climate change committees provide
resources, funds, and attention to a totally unique and demanding
field of legislation and hold an enviable vantage point. Their
importance cannot be understated. These committees give
legislatures a seat at the table in regards to power to enact climate
change legislation.

B. Sub-cabinets, Commissions, and Advisory Groups
These assemblies, sub-cabinets, commissions, or advisory
groups, wield significant influence and have varied power and
influence. These committees, as demonstrated below, can be
organized by the executive or can be created by legislature and
signed into law by the executive, thus granting the resources the
legislature can give. The discussion and analysis includes a brief,
selected subset, not an absolute listing of state initiatives to create
information-gathering organizations.
Montana Governor Steve Bullock assembled an interim Clean
Power Advisory Group from various state actors and citizens to
197
advise the Montana Department of Environmental Quality. The
Council's purpose was a one-time submission of recommendation to
the executive's environmental agency regarding clean power options
in Montana. 198 The governor, here, assembled experts in the field to
help take informed action combating climate change in Montana.
In 2005, Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano signed an executive
199
order creating the Climate Change Advisory Group.
Napolitano
assembled thirty five individuals to form a team to advise her
administration on how to address greenhouse gas emissions and
196. Id.
197. See Press Release, Mont. Office of the Governor, Governor Steve Bullock Announces
Interim Clean Power Plan Advisory Council Members, https://governor.mt.gov/Newsroom/
Governor-Steve-Bullock-Announces-Interim-Clean-Power-Plan-Advisory-Council-Members.
198. Id.
199. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2005-02 (Mar. 20, 2017), http://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/
cdm/ref/collection/execorders/id/465.
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to create a long-term plan to curb emissions in Arizona. 200 The
executive order emphasized keeping jobs and natural resources
preserved while doing everything possible to address Gases. 201 The
Group also was to take inventory of Arizona's current greenhouse
·
·
202
gas em1ss10ns.
Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich assembled the Illinois Climate
Change Advisory Group through Executive Order. 203 Similar to
other groups mentioned, the Committee was to gather research and
present the executive with a climate change plan he could enact. 204
The executive order also mandated the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency to submit an annual report tracking fseenhouse
gas emissions across the state and forecast new trends. 2 5
In 2007, Governor Sarah Palin signed an administrative
order creating the Alaska Climate Change Sub-Cabinet. 206 The SubCabinet was dedicated to creating a climate change plan for Alaska
and publishing a high-profile plan for mitigation of risks. 207 The
Sub-cabinet was solely organized under the role of the executive. 208
These commissions or committees have vast power. They can
attempt fact-finding missions; draw attention to issues; maneuver
more flexibly than the governor across the state and communicate
with various actors; they can bring in varied voices from across the
spectrum; and finally, they can assess the needs of the state and
make findings in a manner political actors cannot. 209 Commissions
and advisory groups are not merely figurehead displays; they have
unique abilities and can achieve real results.

IX. RECENT ACTION
By most metrics, it can be noted that the Trump Administration
has moved resoundingly fast in instituting reform within the
regulatory state. 210 In addition, the President has withdrawn from
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Ill. Exec. Order No. 2006-11 (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/
government/execorders/2016_1 l.aspx.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. Alaska Admin. Order No. 238 (Mar. 13, 2017), https://gov.alaska.gov/adminorders/238.html.
207. Id.
208. Rick Steiner, Gov. Parnell Must Revive Alaska Climate Change Cabinet, ALAsKA
DISPATCH NEWS, Mar. 7, 2013, https://www.adn.com/commentary/article/gov-parnell-mustrevive-alaska-climate-change-cabinet/2013/03/08/.
209 See generally The Role of Committees in the Legislative Process, supra note 183.
210. Chris Cillizza, President Trump Likes To Move Fast. The Public Isn't Thrilled.,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/03/thetrump-administration-is-very-proud-of-how-fast-its-moving-the-public-is-less-
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the Paris Climate Accord, sparking passionate responses on both
sides of the aisles. Below, responses from state actors advocating for
climate change policy already seen in the Trump Administration are
included.

A. The Paris Climate Accord
Even in the lead-up to President Trump withdrawing from the
Paris Climate Accord, governors, other state actors, and even large
companies were putting pressure on the President to
reconsider withdrawal and making preliminary plans should the
Administration do so. 211 Nonetheless, the attempts to lobby the
President were unsuccessful and in the wake of the announcement,
pacts and groups began to form amongst state actors. 212 The U.S.
Climate Alliance (USCA) was launched immediately after the White
House made the announcement. 213 A state-led group materialized
before the President's eyes as governors pledged their commitments
to the principles of the Paris Climate Accord and vowed their
membership to the USCA. 214 USCA's stated goals mirror the Paris
215
Climate Accord; members vow to reduce emissions from 26-28%.
While primarily populated by Democratic governors, the USCA
boasts Republican Governors Charlie Baker of Massachusetts, and
Phil Scott of Vermont as well. 216
In response, the White House seemed uncharacteristically
complacent in regards to this step. As demonstrated by White House
Press Secretary Sean Spicer statement that,
If a mayor or a governor wants to enact a policy on a
range of issues, they are accountable to their own voters, and
that's what they should do. We believe in states' rights, so if

thrilled/?utm_term=.a903155dac3e; Richard Pierce, Is Trump Moving Too Fast? Checks and
Balances Will Slow Him Down, THE HILL, (Feb. 12, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/the-administration/319083-is-trum p-moving-too-fast-checks-and-balances-will-slow.
211. See Marianne Lavelle, Climate Action Will Thrive on State and Local Level, Leaders
Vow After Trump Order, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.
org/news/2903201 7/climate-change-mayors-states-donald-trum p-executive-order.
212. Id.
213. Doyle Rice, More States Sign on to U.S. Climate Alliance to Honor Paris Agreement,
USA TODAY (June 8, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/06/08/morestates-sign-us-climate-alliance-honor-paris-agreement/102629160/.
214 See id.
215. Id.
216 See Timothy Luetkemeyer, Fighting Climate Change in Post-Paris Agreement
America: Reducing Livestock Emissions, 94 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 418, 422 (2017); David
Abel, Mass. Joins Other States to Fulfill US Pledges On Carbon, THE
BOSTON
GLOBE,
June
2,
2017,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/02/
climate/qELM7JPNpKnORMMqkzi2XJ/story.html.
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a locality, a municipality or a state wants to enact a policy,
that their voters or American citizens believe in, then that's
what they should do. 217
From the statement alone it appears the Trump Administration
goes as far as to give validation to the USCA, as long as it's the will
of member states' constituents.
Perhaps most curious is the response on the city and
municipality level. Beyond the statehouses, U.S. mayors reacted
strongly to the President's actions regarding the Climate Accord and
vowed that they would step up the fight through action in their
respective city halls. 218 The Mayors of Chicago and Boston have
.
. t h eir
. responses. 219 I n an act seeming
. 1y
m
b een nota bl y pass10nate
mirroring the USCA, 365 Mayors across the nation have founded an
organization, nicknamed "The Climate Mayors," or the "Mayors
220
National Climate Action Agenda." These Mayors have vowed to
take steps to fight climate change and created new goals and
deadlines to reduce their emissions, and appear to be working in
tandem with a similar effort through the Governor's USCA. Though,
it should be noted, Mayoral action was included for thoroughness of
explanation and bears little resounding consequence of federalist
action in climate change.

B. The Clean Power Plan
The Trump Administration's only foray in to the climate change
arena was not solely the Paris Climate Accord. The Trump
Administration has released a slew of memoranda, notices, policy
shifts, and drafts all working to adjust the previous
Administration's climate policy. 221 The Executive Order instructing
the EPA to begin review or revision of the Clean Power Plan,
however, drew significant drawback from State Actors. Indeed,
much like the decision to abandon the Paris Climate Accord, state
officials were vowing to meet standards alone. Governors Cuomo
217. Benjamin Storrow, Governors Face Pressure to Distance Themselves from Trump on
Climate, THE SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (June 5, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/governors-face-pressure-to-distance-themselves-from-trump-on-climate/.
218. See generally id.
219. Id.
220. Lizette Alvarez, Mayors, Sidestepping Trump, Vow to Fill Void on Climate Change,
NEW YORK TIMES, June 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/mayors-trumpclimate-change .html.
221. Robinson Meyer, Trump's EPA Repeals a Landmark Obama Climate Rule, THE
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and Brown, New York and California, each promised their
commitment
to
the
Clean Power Plan,
despite the
222
Trump Administration's actions.
New York Attorney General
Eric Schneiderman vowed to lead a coalition of State Attorneys
General challenging the action, going so far as to say he would take
it to the Supreme Court. 223 The beauty of these actions is not merely
opposing or advocating for a policy that may or may not be favorable,
but the ability vested in the states to take action on climate change.
X. CONCLUSION

Climate change is an overtly politicized matter, and the analysis
has not shied away from this; it is no secret that states with
opposing heads of government to President Trump will relish taking
climate change action first and allocating resources in defiance of
the Trump Administration. If de-politicization of climate change is
to occur effectively, states must act evenly and remove personal or
political animus from the equation, to administer and create climate
change initiatives uniformly. Each state carries a varied and
distinct risk of climate change harm or benefit; state governments
can react in a way the most environmentally friendly federal
government could not. Professor Felix Mormann summarizes the
merits of federal versus state government initiatives as follows:
Those who argue for implementation at the federal level
point to the better fit with the inter-state nature of the U.S.
electricity grid, efficiency gains from a unified, national
market for trading RECs and the reduced risk of regulatory
leakage. Proponents of state-level renewable portfolio
standards, on the other, hand, argue that existing state
policy activism displaces the need for federal action, states
are better positioned to account for local renewable
resources, and have historically been tasked with
. . t h eir
. own energy port£o1·10s. 224
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State governments are too capable and too talented at responding
to climate change to let it remain subject to the inert political
dangers it faces at the national level.
The analysis and explanation above was meant to provide a
framework, or blueprint, of sorts, illustrating authorized, legal
action that states can take to combat climate change. There is much
at stake in the fight against climate change and the actions taken
by states cannot be mired in complex legal challenges and
adjudicatory actions. Beyond legality of action, extensive precedent
and example for states to act were provided, and the ability to, at
times, go past the state legislatures was explored as well. Be it
negotiating with foreign leaders or entering compacts with various
states within the union, states have more capacity now than ever
before to take up arms the climate change fight.
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